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I. INTRODUCTION
Tommy and Joey are aging musicians still trying to make it big in
Minnesota’s Twin Cities.2  Though not in business together, they
share studio space in the same building through separate leases.  In
addition to their music, they also share a passion for limited govern-
ment and deficit reduction, which bleeds into their songs of govern-
mental intrusion and excessive taxation.  Unhappy with Minnesota
Governor Mark Dayton’s handling of the state’s government shutdown
in the summer of 2011, the pair decides the governor has to go.  How-
ever, the two are unable to agree on any aspects of a protest song save
for its theme.  Instead, Tommy determines that because their studio
space adjoins a hallway all studio visitors must walk through, such an
arrangement is ideal for posting signs advocating for Governor Day-
ton’s defeat in the next election.  Having little to no graphic design
experience, Joey takes this idea to the local Minneapolis College of Art
and Design, where he makes a deal with a student to design some
signs.  Including the costs for materials and labor, the total price for
the job tallies at $105.  Finding the price reasonable and the signs ad-
mirable, Tommy and Joey purchase and hang them up.
A few days later, another musician, Alex, sees the signs for the
first time.  Both a supporter of wide social safety nets and a local ac-
tivist who has some familiarity with election law, he files a complaint
with the Minnesota Campaign Finance and Public Disclosure Board
detailing Tommy and Joey’s election activity.  They soon receive a
strongly-worded letter from the Board warning them of a possible vio-
lation of Minnesota’s campaign finance laws for which they are being
audited.3  Because the pair worked together on the signs, they are an
association required by Minnesota law to form a fund and register
with the state for any independent expenditures exceeding $100.  Fur-
thermore, either Joey, Tommy, or a third party has to become the
fund’s treasurer, who must fill out a form disclosing the fund’s contrib-
utors and expenditures.  This, however, is not the only report.  The
2. This introductory case study is a work of fiction.  Names, characters, and places
are either products of the author’s imagination or used fictitiously.  Any resem-
blance to any person, living or dead, is purely coincidental.
3. For the procedure for filing a complaint and the Board’s response to it, see MINN.
CAMPAIGN FIN. & PUB. DISCLOSURE BD., COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATION OF THE CAM-
PAIGN FINANCE & PUBLIC DISCLOSURE ACT (2012), available at http://www.cfbre-
port.state.mn.us/pdfStorage/2010/CampFin/YE/14857.pdf.
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two dodged a bullet, because 2011, which is not a general election
year, only requires one report from them.  But if they do not file a
termination of the fund in 2012, they will have to file five more re-
ports.  Moreover, following a quick study of the law, the two musicians
could not determine whether terminating the fund meant they were
legally obligated to take down their signs, too.  When the pair made a
decision to exercise their political speech, they could not have
imagined the extensive regulations thereby implicated.
Minnesota’s laws are particularly interesting and potentially divi-
sive because, following the seminal Citizens United v. FEC decision,4
they are perhaps the most extensive of any state disclosure laws in
effect to be deemed unconstitutional.5  This Note considers the narrow
question of whether, when viewed through the lens of political reality,
Minnesota’s disclosure laws regulating independent expenditures,
particularly one requiring ongoing periodic reporting, cross the line
from a mere administrative cost to a burden chilling the free speech of
associations.  Part II of this Note first examines the principles of dis-
closure and the legislative regulation of elections through disclosure
throughout United States history alongside Supreme Court precedent
interpreting those laws.  This leads into Minnesota pushing back
against Citizens United by subsequently enacting several disclosure
laws.  Part III argues that the majority in Minnesota Citizens incor-
rectly held that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed in a challenge that
the laws were unconstitutional.  In its quest to protect all associations
from speech regulation, the majority overstated the actual burden of
these disclosure laws out of fear they could hypothetically cause hesi-
tation in spending money as political speech.  Such a decision does not
account for political theory and reality, and the truth is that the effect
of such a ruling is an elimination of one of the few remaining mecha-
nisms to regulate elections.  Part IV concludes by emphasizing that
the majority was mistaken in its narrow approach to this issue and
that these disclosure laws should have been upheld.
4. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
5. Compare Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. v. Swanson, No. 10-3126, 2012
WL 3822216, at *2–4 (8th Cir. Sept. 5, 2012) (en banc) (Minnesota laws, passed
by the legislature, require periodic reporting), with Nat’l Org. for Marriage v.
McKee, 649 F.3d 34, 43 (1st Cir. 2011) (Maine independent expenditure disclo-
sure laws resemble event-driven reporting, not periodic reporting), Nat’l Org. for
Marriage v. Daluz, 654 F.3d 115, 118 (1st Cir. 2011) (Rhode Island law also re-
sembles event-driven reporting), and Human Life of Wash. Inc. v. Brumsickle,
624 F.3d 990, 996–97 (9th Cir. 2010) (Washington disclosure law at issue was
passed as part of a voter-enacted ballot initiative rather than solely by the legis-
lature), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1477 (2011).
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II. BACKGROUND
A. The Theory and Principles Underlying Disclosure
Disclosure, as it applies in the electoral context, can be defined as
government-required divulgement of information to “help [citizens]
make informed choices in the political marketplace.”6  It is a concept
central to our democracy and one recognized early and supported in
our nation’s history.7  Early in the twentieth century, future Supreme
Court Justice Louis Brandeis recognized in an oft-quoted statement
that “[p]ublicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and indus-
trial diseases.  Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric
light the most efficient policeman.”8  Furthermore, disclosure is the
most widely adopted regulatory device for elections in democratic
nations.9
The basic tenet underlying disclosure is anticorruption.  The abil-
ity to purchase political access or influence is “antithetical to our ideal
of equal citizenship.”10  With the enhanced capability to bankroll a
campaign or indirectly support one, the wealthy and corporate or
other concentrations of wealth have advantages both in money and
political power over the unaligned masses.  Mitigating this potential
political corruption requires a democracy to “draw[ ] a line, marking a
political sphere within which the power relationships of the market
are kept under democratic control.”11  Disclosure thus plays an impor-
tant role, because the citizenry, armed with knowledge about cam-
paign contributions, can hold candidates accountable for such
influence.12  Alarmingly, the United States Supreme Court has whit-
6. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 915.
7. “I deem [an] essential principle[ ] of our Government, and consequently [one]
which ought to shape its administration . . . the diffusion of information . . . .”
Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address, in 33 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEF-
FERSON, 17 FEBRUARY TO 30 APRIL 1801, at 148–52 (Barbara B. Oberg et al. eds.,
2006).
8. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY: AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92
(1914).
9. Richard Briffault, Campaign Finance Disclosure 2.0, 9 ELECTION L.J. 273, 273
(2010) (citing Joel W. Johnson, Democracy and Disclosure: Electoral Systems and
the Regulation of Political Finance, 7 ELECTION L.J. 325 (2008)).
10. Ian Ayres, Disclosure Versus Anonymity in Campaign Finance, in DESIGNING
DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS 19, 22–23 (Ian Shapiro & Stephen Macedo eds., 2000)
(citing Daniel Hays Lowenstein, On Campaign Finance Reform: The Root of All
Evil is Deeply Rooted, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 301, 302 (1989)).
11. Id. (quoting Bruce Ackerman, Crediting the Voters: A New Beginning for Cam-
paign Finance, 13 AM. PROSPECT 71, 71 (1993)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
12. See id. at 24.  Ayres posits an intriguing theory that anonymity, rather than dis-
closure, would better deter corruption because candidates’ obliviousness to the
identity of their campaign finance supporters “might make it harder for candi-
dates to sell access or influence.” Id. at 20.  This theory assumes, however, a
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tled away at the anticorruption principle in the context of independent
expenditures.13
Disclosure also serves an idealistic belief that government trans-
parency is essential.  This idea is that knowledge of which interests
give how much money to elected officials is as “necessary for the suc-
cess of representative democracy as open meeting laws, public access
to government records, lobbying regulation, and government ethics
laws.”14
Moreover, disclosure may be the preferred alternative in campaign
finance for both politicians and industry, because it exposes, rather
than limits, corporate influence.15  It allows the public, not the gov-
ernment, to determine whether campaign expenditures are corrupt.16
Of course, this conclusion rests on the assumption that the citizenry
cares.17  Disclosure requirements serve little purpose if Americans do
not act on the information provided to them through protest or the
voting booth.
B. The History of Legislative Regulation of Campaign
Finance Through Disclosure
State disclosure laws have existed since the late nineteenth cen-
tury, and quickly following them was one of the first federal disclosure
laws—the Publicity and Political Contributions Act of 1910.  That law
required limited disclosure of contributions for members of the House
of Representatives.18  Other requirements were soon added to the
mandate of the 1910 disclosure laws, including an increase in the
number of disclosure reports as required by the Federal Corrupt Prac-
tices Act of 1925.19  While these early laws were poorly drafted and
scenario where absolutely no communication exists between contributors and
candidates.
13. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 910 (2010).
14. Briffault, supra note 9, at 274.
15. Id. at 273 (citing PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON CAMPAIGN COSTS, FINANCING PRESIDEN-
TIAL CAMPAIGNS 18 (1962)).
16. Id. at 273–74.
17. Ayres argues that disclosure produces “very little deterrent benefit” because to-
day’s citizenry does not impose any electoral punishment on candidates who sell
political access.  Ayres, supra note 10, at 24.  This fact, he argues, supports the
theory of anonymous expenditures as it could negate the informational aspect of
disclosure and stifle candidates’ ability to even sell access. Id. at 23–25.
18. ROBERT E. MUTCH, CAMPAIGNS, CONGRESS AND COURTS: THE MAKING OF FEDERAL
CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW (1988); Briffault, supra note 9, at 273 (citing LOUISE
OVERACKER, MONEY IN ELECTIONS 291–94 (1932)).  The 1910 act followed the Till-
man Act of 1907, which had banned corporate contributions to any candidate al-
together. See Act of Jan. 26, 1907, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864, 864–65 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 610 (2006)).
19. Briffault, supra note 9, at 273 (citing MUTCH, supra note 18, at 12–15, 24–25).
2013] DISCLOSURE BURDENS 711
clumsily enforced, they established an obligation of disclosure to the
public revealing where money came from and how it was spent.20
Early Supreme Court decisions upheld these disclosure laws and
provided cleaner analysis than future cases because only direct contri-
butions to candidates implicated disclosure.21  However, a different
form of campaign finance, now known as “independent expenditures,”
could be employed by individuals or associations not in conjunction
with a candidate yet still in his or her support or in opposition to an-
other candidate.22  Because these early campaign finance laws regu-
lated only direct contributions, those making independent
expenditures did not trigger disclosure laws.
The regulation of independent expenditures budded with the Taft-
Hartley Act of 1947, which prohibited direct contributions and inde-
pendent expenditures by corporations.23  However, a narrow construc-
tion of the statute allowed corporations to easily sidestep the Act by
supporting candidates through other channels.24  The regulation of in-
dependent expenditures came to fruition with the passage of the Fed-
eral Election Campaigns Act of 1971 (FECA).25  Enacted in the wake
of the Watergate scandal, FECA was a comprehensive campaign fi-
nance reform allowing corporations to avoid the independent expendi-
ture ban by forming a Political Action Committee (PAC), a highly-
regulated entity created for the purpose of campaign finance.26
Soon after, Buckley v. Valeo,27 a touchstone case for campaign fi-
nance disclosure, arose out of numerous constitutional challenges.
Senator James Buckley of New York, Democratic presidential candi-
date Eugene McCarthy, and the New York Civil Liberties Union all
20. Id.
21. See generally Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934) (upholding the
Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925 requirement that presidential campaign
committees report the names and addresses of contributors to the House of Rep-
resentatives).  The Court in Burroughs held that Congress had the power to pre-
vent corruption with the “choice of means to that end” as a question solely for it.
Id. at 547.  The Court viewed Congress’s action in this context as reasonable to
promote public disclosure to prevent “corrupt use of money to affect elections.”
Id. at 545–48.  These views seem at odds with the current Roberts Court’s readi-
ness to invalidate legislatively-enacted campaign finance laws. See infra section
III.B.
22. Independent expenditures are defined by Minnesota law as: “expenditure[s] ex-
pressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate” if made
without any sort of cooperation with any candidate, the candidate’s committee, or
an agent thereof. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 10A.01(18) (West Supp. 2012).
23. Labor Management Relations Act, ch. 120, § 340, 61 Stat. 139, 159–160 (1947).
24. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 953 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing
FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. 449, 511 (2007) (Souter, J., dissenting)).
25. Federal Elections Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (codified as
amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431–456 (2006)).
26. See id. § 302, 86 Stat. at 12–13.
27. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
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challenged 1974 FECA amendments that limited, among other things,
independent expenditures.28 Buckley distinguished direct contribu-
tions from independent contributions by rendering a financial ceiling
on independent expenditures unconstitutional for violating the First
Amendment while at the same time retaining the limitation on direct
contributions.29  While invalidating the limitation on independent ex-
penditures, the Supreme Court recognized the importance of disclo-
sure, though not without concern over the chilling effect on speech
created by the disclosure of contributors’ names and contribution in-
formation.30  The Court’s solution for this conundrum was to lay a
firm foundation for the “exacting scrutiny” of disclosure laws, which
could survive a constitutional challenge only by constituting a sub-
stantial relation between the governmental interest and the informa-
tion required by disclosure.31
Consequently, Buckley upheld FECA’s independent expenditure
disclosure requirements only so far as the expenditure was “express
advocacy” using a number of magic words the Court supplied.32  As a
result of this ruling, from 1976 to 2002 hundreds of millions in corpo-
rate funds were poured into federal campaign advertisements through
a legally sound “sham issue ad” loophole.33  These advertisements
could feature a candidate near an election but simply avoid the use of
Buckley’s magic words of express advocacy, thereby bypassing regula-
tions, including the disclosure requirements, upheld in Buckley.34
Congress’s response to this and other loopholes, largely
spearheaded by Arizona Senator John McCain and Wisconsin Senator
Russell Feingold, was the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002
(BCRA).35  The Act amended section 441b of FECA in part by adding a
28. Id. at 7–8.
29. Id. at 58–59.  The Court held that direct contribution limits, “along with the dis-
closure provisions, constitute the Act’s primary weapons against the reality or
appearance of improper influence,” but that the Act’s ceiling on independent ex-
penditures infringed on “the ability of candidates, citizens and associations to
engage in protected political expression, restrictions that the First Amendment
cannot tolerate.” Id.
30. Briffault supra note 9, at 280 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66).
31. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64–68.
32. Id. at 43–44 (“We agree that in order to preserve the provisions against invalida-
tion on vagueness grounds, § 608(e)(1) must be construed to apply only to expend-
itures for communications that in express terms advocate the election or defeat of
a clearly identified candidate for federal office.”).
33. CIARA TORRES-SPELLISCY, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, TRANSPARENT ELECTIONS
AFTER CITIZENS UNITED 4 (2011) (citing CRAIG B. HOLMAN & LUKE P. MCLOUGH-
LIN, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, BUYING TIME 2000: TELEVISION ADVERTISING IN
THE 2000 FEDERAL ELECTIONS 10–11 (2001)).
34. Id.
35. Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81.
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new definition, “electioneering communications,”36 which subjected
communications such as sham issue ads to regulation and disclo-
sure.37  The only vehicle for a corporation or other association to fi-
nance express advocacy through independent expenditures was
through the “separate segregated fund” known as a PAC.38  The fall-
out from the BCRA culminated in the highly controversial and hotly
contested Citizens United decision.  What began as an argument that
Supreme Court precedent excused a film and its advertisements from
disclosure requirements “morphed . . . into a paradigm-shifting Su-
preme Court case about the ability of all corporations to spend their
treasury money on any election ad.”39
In Citizens United, the plaintiff wanted to make its documentary
Hillary, a critique on presidential candidate Hillary Rodham Clinton,
available through video-on-demand within thirty days of a 2008 pri-
mary election.40  Fearing that the film and its advertisements would
subject the corporation to civil and criminal penalties under FECA,
Citizens United sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the
Federal Election Commission (FEC).41  It argued that section 441b of
FECA, which required a corporation to form a PAC to make indepen-
dent expenditures, was unconstitutional along with BCRA’s dis-
claimer and disclosure requirements as applied to the movie and its
advertisements.42
Holding that the documentary was functionally equivalent to ex-
press advocacy, which meant section 441b of FECA indeed applied to
it,43 the Court, in a sharply divided 5-4 decision, agreed with the
plaintiff that section 441b was unconstitutional.44  The reasoning
given for this decision was that “the Government may not suppress
political speech [with burdensome regulations] on the basis of the
speaker’s corporate identity.”45  As a result, the Supreme Court case
Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce46 was overruled along with
36. 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A)–(C) (2006) (“[A]ny broadcast, cable, or satellite communi-
cation that . . . refers to a clearly identified candidate . . . within 60 days before a
general election . . . or within 30 days before a primary . . . [which] can be received
by 50,000 or more persons [in that candidate’s constituency].”).
37. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 887 (2010) (citing 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2)
(2006)).
38. Id. at 887–88 (citing 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2)).
39. Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Has the Tide Turned in Favor of Disclosure? Revealing
Money in Politics after Citizens United and Doe v. Reed, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV.
1057, 1057 (2011).
40. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 888.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 889–90.
44. Id. at 917.
45. Id. at 913.
46. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
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BCRA section 203 and section 441b’s prohibition on the use of corpo-
rate treasury funds for express advocacy.47  Further, the Supreme
Court was compelled to overrule McConnell v. FEC48 in part because
the decision relied on reasoning from Austin to uphold BCRA section
203’s extension of section 441b restrictions on corporate independent
expenditures.49
Yet, even as the Court rejected limitations on corporate indepen-
dent expenditures, it ruled 8-1 in favor of preserving disclosure re-
quirements without limitation to speech “that is the functional
equivalent of express advocacy,” or to particular media or technology
from a particular speaker.50  Disclosure was held to enable the electo-
rate to “react to the speech of corporate entities in a proper way” while
not actually preventing anyone from speaking.51  The Court again en-
dorsed election disclosures in Doe v. Reed, where it upheld a Washing-
ton law allowing public disclosure of petition signatories because it
“preserv[ed] the integrity of the electoral process” and prevented fraud
while promoting transparency and accountability.52
The general principle that can be derived from these recent cases is
that elections are special—a right to anonymity in “speech must gen-
erally give way to governmental interests in the overall integrity of
the democratic process.”53  But following Citizens United and Doe, re-
laxed election laws have triggered a veritable arms race in election
spending with a handful of wealthy donors heightening the prolifera-
tion.54  Even comedian Stephen Colbert had a SuperPAC, painting a
satirical portrait of the absurd and disturbing aspects of the state of
U.S. campaign finance law.55  On the legal side of this issue, “a slew of
election-year challenges to disclosure laws” are testing the applicabil-
ity of Citizens United to state election regulation through disclosure.56
Minnesota Citizens is one of these cases, and Citizens United provided
the legal framework for a majority of the Eighth Circuit to banish
many of Minnesota’s disclosure laws to the pages of history.
47. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913.
48. 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
49. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913.
50. Id. at 891, 915.
51. Id. at 914, 916.
52. 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2819 (2010).
53. Torres-Spelliscy, supra note 39, at 1084.
54. See The SuperPAC Superdonors, NPR (July 23, 2012), http://www.npr.org/2012/
02/13/146836082/the-superpac-super-donors.
55. See Colbert Super PAC, AMERICANS FOR A BETTER TOMORROW, TOMORROW, http://
www.colbertsuperpac.com/home.php (last visited Dec. 12, 2012).
56. Torres-Spelliscy, supra note 39, at 1084.
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C. Minnesota Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. v. Swanson
1. Factual and Procedural History: Backlash from Citizens
United
“[R]egarded as a leader in campaign finance reform,” Minnesota
has had “some of the nation’s toughest laws on political spending by
corporations.”57  In 1988, Minnesota effectively banned corporate
spending, and violations at that time could lead to hefty fines, up to
five years of jail time, and for out-of-state corporations the risk of los-
ing the right to do business in the state.58  Continuing in this vein and
in reaction to the Citizens United ruling, the Minnesota legislature
amended several of its election statutes to comply with that landmark
ruling by permitting corporate independent expenditures—but only if
a number of conditions were met.59
While Minnesota “retained a longstanding prohibition on direct
corporate contributions to candidates and affiliated entities,”60 it al-
lowed only two avenues for corporations to make independent expend-
itures exceeding $100: either form and register an independent
expenditure fund or contribute to an existing independent expendi-
ture political committee or political fund.61
In addition, the revised statutes imposed a number of burdensome
requirements on these funds.  When making or receiving a contribu-
tion or independent expenditure exceeding $100, an association there-
after must appoint a treasurer for the fund who must register it
within fourteen days by filing a form detailing the fund’s depositories
and the names and addresses of the fund, treasurer, and any deputy
treasurers.62  Once established, the political fund is statutorily re-
quired to file frequent, detailed reports with disclosures of contribu-
tors, lenders, expenditures, recipients, amounts, and dates.63
Recordkeeping requirements for audit purposes were imposed,64 as
were procedures for dissolving a political fund65 or disposing of assets
by returning contributions to their sources.66
57. John Gibeaut, A Cautionary Tale of Corporate Political Spending Emerges in




59. See 2010 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 2001–08 (West).
60. Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. v. Swanson, 640 F.3d 304, 308 (8th Cir.
2011) (citing MINN. STAT. ANN. § 211B.15(2) (West Supp. 2012)), rev’d en banc,
No. 10-3126, 2012 WL 3822216 (8th Cir. Sept. 5, 2012).
61. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 10A.12(1)(a) (West Supp. 2012).
62. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 10A.12(3), 10A.14(1)–(2) (West Supp. 2012).
63. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 10A.20 (West Supp. 2012).
64. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 10A.13 (West 2005).
65. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 10A.24 (West 2005).
66. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 10A.01(26)(2), 211B.12 (West Supp. 2012).
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A corporation choosing merely to contribute to an existing fund
subjected itself to fewer statutory requirements.67  For-profits had
only to provide their name and address for contributions made from
their general treasury while non-profits had to disclose information on
the source of the contribution to a political fund or committee if it ex-
ceeded $5,000.68
Soon after these amendments, attorney James Bopp Jr., the “origi-
nal architect behind [Citizens United]” and plaintiffs’ arguing attorney
in Minnesota Citizens, challenged Minnesota’s new laws and those in
other states primarily on behalf of ideological clients opposed to same-
sex marriage and abortion rights.69  Bopp stated that Minnesota had
“employed a common method” and “[w]hat is particularly reprehensi-
ble about [the] approach is Citizens United says you just can’t do
that.”70
Various groups filed a Verified Complaint for Declaratory and In-
junctive Relief against Minnesota Attorney General Lori Swanson,
among others, in her official capacity in the United States District
Court for the District of Minnesota.71  Plaintiffs (collectively “Minne-
sota Citizens”) included: Minnesota Citizens Concerned for Life, a
nonprofit advocacy group opposed to abortion;72 the Taxpayers
League of Minnesota, a nonprofit advocacy group supporting lower
taxes and limited government;73 and Coastal Travel Enterprises,
LLC, a for-profit business providing retail travel industry services.74
The plaintiffs challenged Minnesota campaign finance and disclo-
sure statutes on the basis that Citizens United rendered such overly
burdensome requirements on independent expenditures, specifically
as applied to PACs, as bans on political speech.75  Therefore, Minne-
sota Citizens argued, the specified statutes “violate First Amendment
free speech and association guarantees as well as Fourteenth Amend-
67. See Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. v. Swanson, No. 10-3126, 2012 WL
3822216, at *2 (8th Cir. Sept. 5, 2012) (en banc).
68. Id.
69. Gibeaut, supra note 57.
70. Id.
71. Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. v. Swanson, 741 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1119
(D. Minn. 2010), rev’d en banc, No. 10-3126, 2012 WL 3822216 (8th Cir. Sept. 5,
2012).
72. For a list of that organization’s legislative successes, see MCCL’s Legislative His-
tory, MINN. CITIZENS CONCERNED FOR LIFE, http://www.mccl.org/page.aspx?pid=
377 (last visited Nov. 3, 2011).
73. See Welcome to the Taxpayers League of Minnesota, TAXPAYERS LEAGUE OF MINN.,
http://www.taxpayersleague.org/home/about-us.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2011).
74. Minn. Citizens, 741 F. Supp. 2d at 1119.
75. Id. at 1126.
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ment equal protection guarantees.”76  They moved for a preliminary
injunction to enjoin enforcement of the statutes.77
To be successful in their pursuit of an injunction under Eighth Cir-
cuit precedent, Minnesota Citizens had to win on four factors: (1)
probability of success on the merits; (2) threat of irreparable harm to
the movant absent a restraining order; (3) the balance of harms; and
(4) the public interest.78
Instead, on September 20, 2010, the district court denied the mo-
tion for a preliminary injunction.79  The plaintiffs failed to meet the
threshold first factor of a preliminary injunction, which, when one is
seeking to invalidate a duly enacted statute, requires a heightened
showing of a likelihood to prevail on the merits.80  Because the stat-
utes in controversy had important public policy goals of reporting and
disclosure of corporations’ independent expenditures and did not re-
quire a corporation to be separate from and cede control of its fund,
Judge Donovan Frank determined that to enjoin them “on the eve of
the upcoming general election,” would “clearly harm . . . the general
public interest.”81
An appeal soon followed and was submitted January 11, 2011.  Ap-
pellants argued they would be likely to prevail on the merits of the
issue of corporate independent expenditures “because Minnesota regu-
lates such expenditures in a manner Citizens United prohibits.”82
2. Holding: Majority and Dissent on the Extent of a Burden
On May 16, 2011, long after the 2010 election season, the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s decision.83  This
ruling was made despite a vigorous dissent from Chief Judge Riley,
who concurred, albeit hesitantly, only with the contention that the
case FEC v. Beaumont84 was still sound precedent for banning direct
corporate contributions.85  His dissent was boldest in questioning
Minnesota’s ongoing reporting requirement with a declaration that
“[a] state should not be able to sidestep strict scrutiny analysis simply
76. Id. at 1119.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1125 (citing Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. C L Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 113 (8th
Cir. 1981)).
79. Id. at 1134–35.
80. Id. at 1134 (citing Planned Parenthood of Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d
724, 732–33 (8th Cir. 2008)).
81. Id.
82. Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. v. Swanson, 640 F.3d 304, 310 (8th Cir.
2011), rev’d en banc, No. 10-3126, 2012 WL 3822216 (8th Cir. Sept. 5, 2012).
83. Id. at 319.
84. FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146 (2003).
85. See Minn. Citizens, 640 F.3d at 323 (Riley, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
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by labeling burdensome regulations as a disclosure law, when the ef-
fect, if not the design, is to discourage corporate speech.”86
Chief Judge Riley’s dissent certainly appears to have been convinc-
ing as the appellants’ petition for a rehearing en banc was considered
and granted by the Eighth Circuit on July 12, 2011.87  The original
opinion and judgment was vacated with a new oral argument sched-
uled for September 21, 2011, in St. Louis.88  The en banc panel of the
Eighth Circuit proceeded to reverse the district court’s denial of a pre-
liminary injunction.89
Now writing for a majority consisting of six of ten Eighth Circuit
justices, Chief Judge Riley retained Minnesota’s contributions ban but
argued the state’s ongoing reporting requirement would fail under ex-
acting scrutiny and hinted without ruling that the ongoing reporting
requirement should be considered under strict scrutiny.90  The dis-
sent, on the other hand, focused on applications of Minnesota’s laws to
real-life scenarios rather than drawn-up hypotheticals in arguing that
the laws would withstand exacting scrutiny.91  This dispute sets up
the core issue subsequently arising from this case: At what point does
a law characterized as a disclosure provision cross the line from sup-
porting a governmental interest to being so burdensome to corporate
independent expenditures that it restricts speech?
The essence of appellants’ pertinent argument92 on appeal was
that the requirement of establishing or contributing to political funds,
along with the funds’ burdensome regulations, “constitute[d] a de
86. Id. at 322 (citing FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 262 (1986);
Nat’l Right to Life Political Action Comm. v. Connor, 323 F.3d 684, 694–95 & n.11
(8th Cir. 2003)).
87. Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. v. Swanson, No. 10-3126 (8th Cir. July 12,
2011) (order granting appellant an en banc hearing, vacating opinion and judg-
ment, and scheduling an en banc argument).
88. Id.
89. Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. v. Swanson, No. 10-3126, 2012 WL
3822216 (8th Cir. Sept. 5, 2012) (en banc).
90. Id. at *8–9.
91. Id. at *18–19 (Melloy, J., concurring and dissenting).
92. A concurrent argument Minnesota Citizens brought in the lower court and on
appeal was that Minnesota “functionally banned all forms of direct corporate con-
tributions.”  Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. v. Swanson, 640 F.3d 304,
310 (8th Cir. 2011), rev’d en banc, No. 10-3126, 2012 WL 3822216 (8th Cir. Sept.
5, 2012).  With no alternative available for the plaintiffs to speak, they argued,
this ban meant the “disputed election laws [were] not properly tailored in light of
the constitutionally heightened level of scrutiny.” Id. The Eighth Circuit sitting
en banc completely rejected that argument along with an alternative one that
Citizens United overruled previous precedent in order to allow direct corporate
contributions if no other means of speech were available. Minn. Citizens, 2012
WL 3822216, at *11–12.  Not only did the Eighth Circuit find that argument
without merit, it stated that it could only follow a divergent line of decisions if the
Supreme Court expressly overruled a prior decision. Id.
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facto ban” on independent expenditures, which should trigger a strict
scrutiny level of review.93  They argued further that, if appellants sat-
isfied the threshold factor of likelihood of success on the merits, they
met the remaining elements for an injunction as well.94
The en banc majority agreed and gave the appellants a boon in
stating that, if plaintiffs showed a likelihood of success in a First
Amendment case, “the other requirements for obtaining a preliminary
injunction are generally deemed to have been satisfied.”95  Thus, the
other considerations, including whether an injunction would affect the
public interest (by, say, invalidating disclosure laws immediately
before an election) will play no role in the decision to grant an injunc-
tion on remand.
Because a government ban on corporate independent expenditures
triggers strict scrutiny, “[n]o sufficient government interest exists to
justify a ban under this constitutionally heightened level of scru-
tiny.”96  The en banc’s majority disagreed with the vacated opinion,
which had been able to distinguish Minnesota’s statutes from the PAC
regulations invalidated by Citizens United as burdensome only in rela-
tion to their goal of upholding the important public interests of in-
forming the electorate and transparency of elections.97  The original
opinion argued that disclosure laws do not prevent speech, and
“[u]nlike outright bans on corporate independent expenditures, which
are viewed with great suspicion and subjected to strict scrutiny,”
courts view corporate disclosure laws as beneficial and subject them to
“less-rigorous” exacting scrutiny.98
But sitting en banc, the majority viewed the ongoing reporting re-
quirement along with the other “collective burdens” of Minnesota’s in-
dependent expenditure laws as a chill on political speech.99  Arguing
the ongoing reporting requirement is “untethered from continued
speech,” the Eighth Circuit stated “less problematic measures,” such
as event-driven reporting, could be used.100  However, as made clear
by the analysis below, this ruling in favor of the appellants eliminated
a valid means of effectuating disclosure and will further erode legisla-
tive protection against corporate spending in elections.
93. Minn. Citizens, 640 F.3d at 310.
94. Id.
95. Minn. Citizens, 2012 WL 3822216, at *4 (quoting Phelps-Roper v. Troutman, 662
F.3d 485, 488 (8th Cir. 2011) (per curiam)).
96. Minn. Citizens, 640 F.3d at 312 (alteration in original) (quoting Citizens United
v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 897–913 (2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
97. See id. at 316.
98. Id. at 315 (citing Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 914).
99. Minn. Citizens, 2012 WL 3822216, at *7.
100. Id. at *9.
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III. ANALYSIS
Corporate influence in American government is nothing new and
not necessarily more pervasive now than it was directly before Citi-
zens United loosened restrictions on independent expenditures or even
further into history.101  Indeed, in the nineteenth century the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court had to press Justice Stephen Field, who
was heavily invested in railroads and other industries, not to weigh in
on certain cases.102  But now, because “the ability to influence elec-
tions by spending great sums of money is considered a legitimate and
important element of our democracy,” disclosure provisions may be at
the pinnacle of their importance.103
The complainants’ action to invalidate Minnesota’s duly enacted
disclosure laws reveals a fundamental legal and policy question con-
cerning what should be an acceptable burden on corporate indepen-
dent expenditures.  Following Chief Judge Riley’s reasoning leads to
the incongruous result that laws requiring corporations to disclose, or
speak, about their independent expenditures suppress their political
speech.  The focus of this issue has become analysis of when a burden
moves from mere “administrative costs” sacrificed for the purposes of
disclosure to unconstitutional suppression of political speech.104  How-
ever, Chief Judge Riley did not fully consider how ongoing reporting
requirements could promote disclosure.
Legal and policy bases justify upholding such a requirement.
First, Minnesota’s laws in general were consistent with those upheld
in Citizens United.  Second, Chief Judge Riley’s opinion, hinting that
ongoing reporting deserves strict scrutiny and fails exacting scrutiny
by being overly burdensome, viewed the disclosure benefits of such a
law too narrowly and runs counter to the policy underlying disclosure
laws.  Finally, Minnesota Citizens’ action to invalidate the ongoing re-
porting requirement not only chips away at one of the last remaining
tools to regulate campaign finance, it demonstrates a disturbing trend
of legislatures’ diminishing power to regulate corporate influence in
elections.  For these reasons, Minnesota’s laws should be upheld.
101. See Eric Sandberg-Zakian, Rethinking “Bias”: Judicial Elections and the Due
Process Clause After Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 64 ARK. L. REV. 179, 179
(2011).
102. See generally Ryan Grim & Mike Sacks, Corporate Citizenship: How Public Dis-
sent in Paris Sparked Creation of the Corporate Person, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct.
12, 2011, 3:18 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/10/12/corporate-citizen-
ship-corporate-personhood-paris-commune_n_1005244.html (describing the his-
tory of corporations as “persons” in light of the Occupy Wall Street protests).
103. Sandberg-Zakian, supra note 101, at 179.
104. See Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. v. Swanson, 640 F.3d 304, 316 (8th
Cir. 2011), rev’d en banc, No. 10-3126, 2012 WL 3822216 (8th Cir. Sept. 5, 2012).
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A. Minnesota’s Independent Expenditure Disclosure Laws—
Consistent with Citizens United or a Burden on
Corporations?
While the plaintiffs argued Minnesota’s laws were “materially in-
distinguishable from the PAC regulations the Supreme Court found to
be unconstitutionally burdensome,” the Eighth Circuit found in its va-
cated Minnesota Citizens opinion that those same provisions were
similar in “purpose and effect” to disclosure laws upheld in Citizens
United and thus were not repugnant to that case.105  This argument,
that Minnesota’s laws impose no greater burden than the disclosure
provisions upheld in Citizens United, is essential.106  Chief Judge
Riley’s vociferous opinion primarily dismisses the utility of Minne-
sota’s ongoing reporting requirement, but, as he lamented the “collec-
tive burdens” of the state’s laws,107 the following analysis counters
that the other provisions of Minnesota’s statutory scheme are not re-
pugnant to Citizens United.
Citizens United stated that corporations have a First Amendment
right to make independent expenditures and PACs were “burdensome
alternatives” by requiring a treasurer, detailed records, organizational
statements, and monthly reports to make such expenditures.108  At
first glance, these requirements do appear remarkably similar to Min-
nesota’s own statutory scheme permitting a corporation’s independent
expenditures;109 however, they do not require the corporation to be
105. Id. at 311.
106. Minnesota lawmakers were fortunate from the outset that more Supreme Court
Justices did not side with Justice Clarence Thomas’s Citizens United dissent.
Fearing potential reprisal against campaign contributors whose names are dis-
closed to the public, Justice Thomas argued disclosure, disclaimer, and reporting
requirements in sections 201 and 311 of BCRA were unconstitutional.  Citizens
United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 982 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).  His basis for this argument was the harassment of Californi-
ans who paid to support Proposition 8, which amended California’s constitution
to allow marriage solely between a man and woman. Id. at 980–81.  “Disclaimer
and disclosure requirements enable private citizens and elected officials to imple-
ment political strategies specifically calculated to curtail campaign-related activ-
ity and prevent the lawful, peaceful exercise of First Amendment rights.” Id. at
982.  Were it possible to incorporate this argument into Minnesota Citizens, Jus-
tice Thomas’s emphasis on the negative ramifications of disclosure laws could
have forced the Eighth Circuit to eliminate the entirety of Minnesota’s disclosure
laws.
107. Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. v. Swanson, No. 10-3126, 2012 WL
3822216, at *7 (8th Cir. Sept. 5, 2012) (en banc).
108. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 897.
109. Compare 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2006) (detailing the limitations on a corporation or la-
bor organization’s ability to make political expenditures or contributions), with
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 10A.025 (West 2005) (detailing filing requirements for ex-
penditures), MINN. STAT. ANN. § 10A.12 (West Supp. 2012) (detailing require-
ments for an independent expenditure fund, including election of a treasurer),
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separate from its fund and allow retention of control over it.110  Fur-
thermore, while striking down a number of other election laws, Citi-
zens United strongly upheld a FECA disclosure provision requiring
those spending more than $10,000 on electioneering communications
to file an extensive report.111  The language of this particular federal
statute bears a remarkable resemblance to Minnesota’s own indepen-
dent expenditure statutes.112  Viewing Minnesota’s provisions collec-
tively, the Eighth Circuit initially found they were “significantly less
burdensome” than the federal regulations on PACs before the en banc
panel decided otherwise.113
An in-depth, side-by-side analysis shows these statutes are materi-
ally the same.  For example, any association with a political fund in
Minnesota is required to elect or appoint a treasurer for the fund.114
This type of requirement is essentially identical to a FECA provision
requiring disclosure of the custodian of the books and accounts of the
one making the disbursement.115  The majority is too quick to dismiss
a treasurer requirement as “only tangentially related to disclo-
sure.”116  A treasurer under Minnesota law is fulfilling the same role
as a custodian under federal law.  A contact person, custodian, trea-
surer, or whatever label is given, is substantially related to the pur-
pose and goal of disclosure by providing the electorate with a readily
available vehicle for ascertaining the true sources of election-related
spending.117  Also, the treasurer “acts as little more than a custodian
of the records.”118
Minnesota further requires the treasurer to register the fund with
a statement of organization no later than fourteen days after the fund
made or received contributions or made expenditures exceeding
$100.119  A committee or fund making an electioneering communica-
tion under the federal law upheld in Citizens United is required to
and MINN. STAT. ANN. § 10A.14 (West Supp. 2012) (detailing the registration re-
quirements for an independent expenditure fund).
110. See Minn. Citizens, 2012 WL 3822216, at *2.
111. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 914 (citing 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(2) (2006)).
112. The federal report “required detailed disclosures and extensive recordkeeping,”
including, among other requirements, disclosure of one’s identity, a records custo-
dian, any recipients’ identities, and the names and addresses of anyone who con-
tributed $1,000 or more to the person or entity paying for the electioneering
communication.  Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. v. Swanson, 640 F.3d
304, 313–14 (8th Cir. 2011) (citing Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 914), rev’d en
banc, No. 10-3126, 2012 WL 3822216 (8th Cir. Sept. 5, 2012).
113. Id. at 314.
114. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 10A.12(3) (West 2005).
115. 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(2)(A) (2006).
116. Minn. Citizens, 2012 WL 3822216, at *8 n.9.
117. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 914.
118. Minn. Citizens, 2012 WL 3822216, at *16 (Melloy, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part).
119. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 10A.14(1) (West Supp. 2012).
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disclose significantly greater expenditures (aggregate amount in ex-
cess of $10,000 in one calendar year); however, they have a far more
burdensome twenty-four hours after the disbursement date rather
than two weeks to file an extensive statement with the FEC.120
Despite ample precedent that a $100 trigger for disclosure was rea-
sonable,121 the Eighth Circuit indicated that such a trigger for ongo-
ing reporting was questionable.122  The majority distinguished
Minnesota’s law from a federal ongoing reporting requirement upheld
in SpeechNow.org v. FEC123 in part because the federal law only ap-
plied to political committees with the major purpose of nominating or
electing a candidate.124  This distinction, along with the majority’s
focus on protecting certain associations because of their “major pur-
pose,”125 is divorced from reality.  Many “social welfare” organiza-
tions, such as Crossroads GPS, enjoy tax exempt status and
apparently can avoid ongoing reporting simply by claiming they run
issue advertisements not in support or opposition to any candidate.126
Yet Karl Rove, a leader of Crossroads GPS, spoke at a retreat hosted
by Tagg Romney, son of Republican presidential candidate Mitt Rom-
ney, and allegedly promoted Rove’s SuperPAC to Romney campaign
donors invited to the retreat.127  The Minnesota Citizens majority has
fallen into the same trap as that in Citizens United with judges mak-
ing technical legal decisions “not [in] accord with the theory or reality
of politics.”128
Additionally, the majority noted that Minnesota’s $100 trigger for
its ongoing reporting requirement was “much lower” than that in
SpeechNow.org,129 which was $1,000.130  This disparity, including the
$10,000 trigger upheld in Citizens United, is misleading.  It can be ex-
plained by the immense differences between spending in state and
federal elections.  Al Franken, the Democratic Senator of Minnesota,
120. 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(1) (2006).
121. See Minn. Citizens, 2012 WL 3822216, at *16 (Melloy, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
122. Id. at *8 n.10.
123. 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc), cert. denied, Keating v. FEC, 131 S. Ct.
553 (2010).
124. Minn. Citizens, 2012 WL 3822216, at *8 n.10.
125. Id. at *10.
126. ‘Social Welfare’ Organizations Play Big Role in Presidential Politics, NPR (July 7,
2012, 6:46 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/itsallpolitics/2012/07/07/156381618/so-
cial-welfare-organizations-play-big-role-in-presidential-politics.
127. Peter H. Stone, Karl Rove Gave Secret Speech Outside Romney Donor Retreat,
HUFFINGTON POST (July 9, 2012, 2:18 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/
07/09/karl-rove-speech_n_1656013.html.
128. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 961 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting in part
and concurring in part).
129. Minn. Citizens, 2012 WL 3822216, at *8 n.10.
130. SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 697 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc).
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raised $29,075,107 and spent $28,947,178 from 2005–2010 (he was
elected in 2008).131  In contrast, Sandra Masin, the Minnesota House
Representative for District 38A from 2007–2010, had a political fund
with receipts totaling $29,471 and disbursements totaling $30,318 in
2010.132  Masin’s opponent in that election, Diane Anderson, had simi-
lar but smaller numbers and was victorious.133  Masin’s receipts were
0.1% of Franken’s, which amounts to an even larger disparity in
spending than the gap between a $100 trigger in Minnesota law and a
$10,000 trigger in federal law (1%).  Though this is but one example, it
illustrates the vast chasm between spending on state elections and
federal congressional elections for politicians of the same state.
Furthermore, while some Minnesota funds paid exorbitant
amounts for independent expenditures,134 others did not come close to
a $10,000 mark.135  If Minnesota is to effectively regulate its own
state elections and provide information to the electorate, a $100 trig-
ger for disclosure and periodic reporting is patently more reasonable
than a $10,000 or even a $1,000 trigger.136  This point is bolstered by
the fact that states generally must contend with regulation of local
judicial elections whereas the federal government does not.137
However, one concern within the Eighth Circuit was that corpora-
tions with limited resources would be discouraged by Minnesota’s pro-
visions and would thus lose access to the citizenry and participation in
131. Al Franken: Summary Data, THE CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, http://www.
opensecrets.org/politicians/summary.php?cid=N00029016&cycle=2010 (last vis-
ited Nov. 4, 2011).
132. MINN. CAMPAIGN FIN. & PUB. DISCLOSURE BD., REPORT OF RECEIPTS AND EXPENDI-
TURES FOR PRINCIPAL CAMPAIGN COMMITTEE: MASIN CAMPAIGN COMMITTEE (2011),
available at http://www.cfbreport.state.mn.us/pdfStorage/2010/CampFin/YE/
14857.pdf.
133. See MINN. CAMPAIGN FIN. & PUB. DISCLOSURE BD., REPORT OF RECEIPTS AND EX-
PENDITURES FOR PRINCIPAL CAMPAIGN COMMITTEE: ANDERSON VOLUNTEER COM-
MITTEE (2011), available at http://www.cfbreport.state.mn.us/pdfStorage/2010/
CampFin/YE/15491.pdf.
134. See MINN. CAMPAIGN FIN. & PUB. DISCLOSURE BD., REPORT OF RECEIPTS AND EX-
PENDITURES FOR POLITICAL COMMITTEE OR POLITICAL FUND: FREEDOM CLUB STATE
PAC (2011), available at http://www.cfbreport.state.mn.us/pdfStorage/2010/
CampFin/YE/40742.pdf (about $223,000).
135. See MINN. CAMPAIGN FIN. & PUB. DISCLOSURE BD., REPORT OF RECEIPTS AND EX-
PENDITURES FOR POLITICAL COMMITTEE OR POLITICAL FUND: TWINWEST CHAMBER
OF COMMERCE PAC (2011), available at http://www.cfbreport.state.mn.us/pdfStor-
age/2010/CampFin/YE/70013.pdf (about $4,300); MINN. CAMPAIGN FIN. & PUB.
DISCLOSURE BD., REPORT OF RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES FOR POLITICAL COMMIT-
TEE OR POLITICAL FUND: TAKEACTION POLITICAL FUND (2011), available at http://
www.cfbreport.state.mn.us/pdfStorage/2010/CampFin/YE/30636.pdf (about
$6,200).
136. See also Nat’l Org. for Marriage v. Daluz, 654 F.3d 115 (1st Cir. 2011) (holding
that a $100 trigger for disclosing independent expenditures was rational).
137. See TORRES-SPELLISCY, supra note 33, at 5.
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political speech.138  The definition of “association” under Minnesota’s
statutory scheme would allow even a partnership to be subjected to
disclosure requirements for independent expenditures exceeding
$100.139  This broad definition does not blatantly target corporations
as the invalidated Citizens United laws did;140 however, it arguably
increases the burden on the smallest of associations that fit under the
definition’s umbrella.  One commentator wrote that “[d]isclosure laws
should not trap the unwary or entangle tiny groups of people spending
relatively small amounts of money.”141  This potential to expose more
associations to extensive regulations makes it significantly more diffi-
cult to demonstrate a substantial relation between disclosure inter-
ests and any burden imposed thereby.
At oral argument for Minnesota Citizen’s September 21, 2011 en
banc hearing, one judge first introduced a hypothetical later used by
the majority in its opinion asking whether two farmers wishing to
make a campaign sign for their yard costing $101 would be subjected
to Minnesota’s extensive statutes.142  The obvious response to this hy-
pothetical, which illustrates the majority’s reliance on speculation and
deservedly spurred a rebuke from the dissent,143 is “yes,” but the real
question is whether Minnesota’s statutes would truly chill these two
farmers’ speech so as to violate the First Amendment.  Nonetheless,
the simple fact that disclosure requirements may deter the ability to
speak is not enough.  The Supreme Court has already stated that dis-
closure requirements “do not prevent anyone from speaking,”144 and,
as discussed above, a $100 trigger for disclosure is reasonable in the
state election context.  The crux of the Minnesota Citizens majority’s
concern is that Minnesota’s requirement of ongoing reporting is so
burdensome that it is the rime threatening to chill corporate
speech.145
138. Minn. Citizens for Life, Inc. v. Swanson, No. 10-3126, 2012 WL 3822216, at *7
(8th Cir. Sept. 5, 2012) (en banc).
139. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 10A.01(6) (West 2005) (“ ‘Association’ means a group of
two or more persons, who are not all members of an immediate family, acting in
concert.”); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 10A.12(1)(a) (West Supp. 2012).
140. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 896–98 (2010).
141. TORRES-SPELLISCY, supra note 33, at 13.
142. Oral Argument at 17:25, Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. v. Swanson, 640
F.3d 304 (No. 10-3126), available at http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/new/
oaByCase.pl?caseno=10-3126&getOA=search.
143. Minn. Citizens, 2012 WL 3822216, at *18 (Melloy, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part).
144. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 914 (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 201
(2003)).
145. Minn. Citizens, 2012 WL 3822216, at *6, *8–9.
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1. Avoiding Strict Scrutiny: A Search for the Purpose of
Ongoing Reporting
A fund in Minnesota, whose formation is required for any indepen-
dent expenditure exceeding $100,146 must file five reports during a
general-election year and one report in other years until a fund is dis-
solved or terminated.147  By contrast, the FECA provisions upheld in
Citizens United, according to the Minnesota Citizens majority, have
“event-driven reporting requirement[s],” that end “as soon as the re-
port [is] filed.”148
To be upheld, Minnesota’s ongoing reporting provision must act for
the integral purpose of disclosure to avoid strict scrutiny and also
have a substantial relation to disclosure to withstand exacting scru-
tiny.149  For the threshold question of whether strict scrutiny is appli-
cable, Chief Judge Riley hinted without ruling that any ongoing
periodic reporting may automatically require strict scrutiny analy-
sis.150  Though the opinion’s dicta left open the “question whether the
Supreme Court intended exacting scrutiny to apply to laws such as
this” rather than strict scrutiny,151 the following analysis argues that
strict scrutiny should not be applied to ongoing reporting
requirements.
The dichotomy in Minnesota Citizens is that the dissent viewed pe-
riodic reporting as an enhancement for transparency152 whereas the
majority suspected the Minnesota legislature of burdening corpora-
tions’ ability to make independent expenditures as much as constitu-
tionally possible.153  This dichotomy originally played out in the
vacated Minnesota Citizens opinion through a debate over whether the
ongoing reporting requirement follows Supreme Court precedent.  The
majority had argued that Buckley v. Valeo approved periodic reporting
requirements for non-PAC entities and that they are not per se inva-
lid.154  Chief Judge Riley’s dissent, on the other hand, distinguished
the periodic reporting law in Buckley because it “at most” required
filing statements through the end of the calendar year.155
146. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 10A.12(1)(a) (West Supp. 2012).
147. Minn. Citizens, 2012 WL 3822216, at *6 (citing MINN. STAT. ANN. § 10A.20 (West
Supp. 2012)).
148. Id. at *8 n.9 (citing 2 U.S.C. § 434(f) (2006)).
149. Id. at *8.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at *14–15 (Melloy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
153. Id. at *6.
154. Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. v. Swanson, 640 F.3d 304, 314 n.4 (8th
Cir. 2011) (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 80–81 (1976)), rev’d en banc, No.
10-3126, 2012 WL 3822216 (8th Cir. Sept. 5, 2012).
155. Id. at 321 (Riley, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing 2 U.S.C.
§ 434(e) (2006)).
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As the en banc dissent in Minnesota Citizens pointed out, at the
very least, once the threshold expenditure amount is made, an associ-
ation could easily establish the fund, file a report, and terminate the
fund with a short statement to the Minnesota Campaign Finance and
Public Disclosure Board.156  This action would be essentially identical
to the event-driven reporting the majority views with approval.157
Further, such disclosure would impose only a light burden while
“shed[ding] the light of publicity” on campaign-related spending that
would not otherwise be reported because it is an independent expendi-
ture.158  Further, any association raring to get into the campaign fi-
nance game has the option of avoiding nearly all of these regulations
by contributing to an existing fund rather than establishing its
own.159
Additionally, the Minnesota Citizens dissent proffers a number of
justifiable reasons to support upholding periodic reports.160  One basis
is for reasons of enforcement and detection of improprieties from a
particular source of campaign finance, which is a policy supported by
precedent.161  While the majority considered these goals, it did not
properly apply them in the context of campaign finance in America.
Ongoing periodic reporting allows the electorate to stay abreast of in-
dependent supporters of a candidate.162  This basis supplies a reason-
able explanation for why five periodic reports are required in a general
election year in Minnesota—when the ability to “evaluat[e] those who
seek . . . office” is most important.163  It is no coincidence that these
justifications for ongoing reporting closely resemble the anticorruption
and transparency principles underlying disclosure.164  Ongoing re-
porting in this context is certainly preferable to the farce of campaign
finance regulation at the federal level, where primary voters in a num-
156. Minn. Citizens, 2012 WL 3822216, at *17 (Melloy, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part).
157. See id. at *8 n.9.
158. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 81.
159. Minn. Citizens, 2012 WL 3822216, at *5.  In an associated footnote, Chief Judge
Riley does point out that this option “does not allow the association itself to
speak. Instead it only allows the association to assist another entity in speaking.
As soon as the contribution is made, the association loses control of the message.”
Id. at *5 n.6.  It is incredible that Citizens United has created an atmosphere
where the option of an association submitting itself to ongoing reporting is con-
sidered an unconstitutional restriction on the exercise of speech through spend-
ing money because another alternative of contribution allegedly alters the
money-speech.
160. See id. at *14–16 (Melloy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
161. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 67–68.
162. Id. at 66–67.
163. Id.
164. See supra text accompanying notes 10–14.
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ber of states could not discover the true source of independent expend-
itures until well after the primary election.165
The Minnesota Citizens dissent, as well as Minnesota,166 could
have served itself better by supplying a real-world example for why
periodic reporting may be necessary.  One potential consequence from
a lack of periodic reporting is illustrated by a recent scenario.  A corpo-
ration, W Spann LLC, contributed $1 million to the Restore Our Fu-
ture PAC, which supported Mitt Romney’s 2012 presidential bid, and
dissolved just four months after formation.167  While the Supreme
Court affirmed the importance of disclosure in Citizens United, the
Court’s lack of foresight has initiated a scenario where corporations
can “give millions to a Super PAC and shut it down before they have to
file annual reports, allowing donors to remain anonymous . . . .”168
Yet, under Minnesota law, W Spann LLC would have been required,
at most, to file periodic reports detailing its election activity up until
termination of the fund if it set up its own fund and, at the very least,
to file a disclosure statement for contributing $5,000 or more to an
existing fund.  Both extremes satisfy the public interest in disclosure,
and arguably Minnesota’s laws could go further to reveal the true na-
ture of entities inserting themselves into political discourse.
It is an association’s choice whether to continue making expendi-
tures and thus continue to fulfill disclosure interests by satisfying
Minnesota’s reporting requirements.  But it cannot expressly or im-
pliedly seek to continue speaking and at the same time complain that
reporting requirements related to that continued speech will chill fu-
ture political speech.  Ongoing reporting is extensive, but the ongoing
nature of it should not be automatically subjected to strict scrutiny
without complete analysis of the law’s virtues and vices.  Chief Judge
Riley took a narrow view and, if confronted with a similar law in the
future, it appeared he would rubber-stamp ongoing reporting as re-
quiring strict scrutiny though an association in Minnesota had a myr-
iad of options to both effectuate disclosure and avoid regulation.
For those who choose to form a fund, the periodic reporting re-
quirements have a reasonable basis because of important governmen-
165. See Jack Gillum, ‘Super’ PACs Set to Disclose Big Donors Tuesday, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Jan. 31, 2012, available at http://news.yahoo.com/super-pacs-set-disclose-
big-donors-tuesday-065005955.html.
166. Apparently the defendant failed to adequately support its ongoing reporting re-
quirement as it did not state “any plausible reason why continued reporting from
nearly all associations, regardless of the association’s major purpose, is necessary
to accomplish these interests.”  Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. v. Swan-
son, No. 10-3126, 2012 WL 3822216, at *10 (8th Cir. Sept. 5, 2012) (en banc).
167. Paul Blumenthal, Secret Corporate Money Powers Pro-Romney Super PAC, HUF-
FINGTON POST (Aug. 4, 2009, 9:14 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/08/
04/w-spann-llc-restore-our-future_n_918051.html.
168. Id.
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tal interests in informing the public and enforcing campaign finance
laws.  While Chief Judge Riley argued an association “must initiate
the bureaucratic process again” to speak after the termination or dis-
solution of a fund,169 he characterizes this act as a suffocation of every
association’s voice while at the same time not giving due regard to
state interests in tracking political organizations’ campaign finance
activities.  The majority’s position could give corporations, which have
already gained a strong foothold in campaign finance, the power to
subject laws serving the public interest to a strict scrutiny death sen-
tence on the mere basis that they allow a state agency to keep periodic
track of election activities.  These laws should instead be subjected to
exacting scrutiny.
2. Exacting Scrutiny Analysis: Tailoring a Burden to Disclosure
The Supreme Court has reviewed challenges to disclosure require-
ments in the electoral context under the exacting scrutiny standard,
requiring “a substantial relation between the disclosure requirement
and a sufficiently important governmental interest.”170  In this case,
the proper inquiry is whether the laws “unnecessarily restrict consti-
tutionally protected liberty.”171
The Minnesota Citizens majority essentially subscribed to Chief
Judge Riley’s opinion that the purpose of Minnesota’s disclosure law
was mere pretense when “the effect, if not the design [of the law], is to
discourage corporate speech.”172  Chief Judge Riley stated in the va-
cated opinion’s dissent that, even under exacting scrutiny, each provi-
sion must be reviewed separately to determine substantial relation to
disclosure interests.173  Unlike the majority in the vacated Eighth Cir-
cuit opinion, the dissent in Minnesota Citizens made strong argu-
ments for why exacting scrutiny would be satisfied in the case.174
This analysis will augment those arguments by pointing out the flaws
in the majority’s reasoning.
The majority “points primarily to the ongoing reporting require-
ment” in its view that the disclosure requirements in the case are too
heavy to satisfy.175  However, simple bookkeeping devices, such as a
basic Microsoft Excel spreadsheet, would limit the cost of complying
169. Minn. Citizens, 2012 WL 3822216, at *6.
170. Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2814 (2010) (quoting Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S.
Ct. 876, 914 (2010)).
171. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 363 (1976).
172. Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. v. Swanson, 640 F.3d 304, 322 (8th Cir.
2011) (Riley, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), rev’d en banc, No.
10-3126, 2012 WL 3822216 (8th Cir. Sept. 5, 2012).
173. Id.
174. See Minn. Citizens, 2012 WL 3822216, at *17–19 (Melloy, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
175. Id. at *17.
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with Minnesota’s regulations by separating and tracking expenditures
and contributions.176  Further, the Minnesota Campaign Finance and
Public Disclosure Board has issued a memorandum stating that a po-
litical fund need not set up a separate bank account from its general
treasury to take contributions and make expenditures.177  These sim-
ple measures reduce reporting to a pithy burden.
However, questions may still arise over whether an association of,
say, two farmers has the expertise to use technology to ease reporting
burdens for independent expenditures.  This issue has a basic counter:
individuals teaming up to make these types of expenditures should be
expected to have the business sense to ease their own burden without
expecting the government to account for every individual association’s
limitations in satisfying the governmental interest of disclosure to the
public.  This logic is also noted by the Minnesota Citizens dissent,
which points out that “the majority’s hypothetical seems to assume
that the farmers are unsophisticated business people . . . .”178
A simple form also eases the burden on Minnesota political funds.
A Taxpayers League Victory Fund form reporting the organization’s
2010 election year activity to the Minnesota Campaign Finance &
Public Disclosure Board is an example of this.179  One can easily check
a box stating that the committee received no contributions or made no
expenditures during that reporting period or to notify the Disclosure
Board that the committee has settled its debts and disposed of its as-
sets in excess of $100 and dissolved.  The rest of the form is fairly
typical—it asks for disclosure of the fund’s balance, its total receipts,
total expenditures, and the certification or signature of the trea-
surer.180  Nothing in the form appears so sinister that it would chill
the speech of associations choosing to participate in the political
speech process.  As the dissent stated, “Minnesota’s check-the-box re-
quirement” does not “rise[ ] to the level of a constitutional
violation.”181
One potential issue is an ambiguity within this law’s termination
provision.  The law provides that a fund may not dissolve until it “dis-
176. See id. at *2.
177. MINN. CAMPAIGN FIN. & PUB. DISCLOSURE BD., DEPOSITORY REQUIREMENT FOR PO-
LITICAL FUNDS (2011), available at http://www.cfboard.state.mn.us/bdinfo/memo_
resolutions_depositories.pdf.
178. Minn. Citizens, 2012 WL 3822216, at *18 (Melloy, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part).
179. See MINN. CAMPAIGN FIN. & PUB. DISCLOSURE BD., REPORT OF RECEIPTS AND EX-
PENDITURES FOR POLITICAL COMMITTEE OR POLITICAL FUND: TAXPAYERS LEAGUE
MN VICTORY FUND (2011), available at http://www.cfbreport.state.mn.us/pdfStor-
age/2010/CampFin/YE/40794.pdf.
180. Id.
181. Minn. Citizens, 2012 WL 3822216, at *18 (Melloy, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part).
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pose[s] of all its assets in excess of $100,” which includes “physical
assets.”182  Minnesota Citizens may have some argument that this re-
quirement of disposing assets is unduly burdensome because it could
be interpreted to require disposition of the assets that are themselves
the independent expenditures.  If a billboard is purchased for adver-
tising and costs more than $100, should a dissolving fund be required
to take down the billboard, the very physical asset it intended to pro-
cure by establishing the fund in the first place?  However, this is but
one interpretation of an ambiguous statute.  The court could have sim-
ply applied the canon of constitutional avoidance to avoid an unconsti-
tutional result.183 Further, any concern over the termination
provision is misplaced as a Minnesota statute establishes a presump-
tion that the legislature does not intend Minnesota laws to reach an
absurd result.184  While the majority stated that it would not rely on
“Minnesota’s informal assurance” that it would not “enforce the plain
meaning of the statute” involving the termination of physical as-
sets,185 it could have disposed of this issue by deferring to the agency’s
interpretation of the statute.  This deference would have avoided both
a constitutional question and not extended the statute to an absurd
result.
Chief Judge Riley also points to the law’s penalty provisions, which
could lead to civil and criminal penalties ranging from fines to impris-
onment of up to five years,186 as burdensome for hindering participa-
tion in political debate.187  But if Minnesota’s other statutes are
viewed as valid in their substantial relation to disclosure, the penalty
provisions are merely enforcement measures.
Most concerning is what appears to be a misapplication of Supreme
Court precedent to outline the Eighth Circuit’s test for finding
whether ongoing reporting failed exacting scrutiny.  The majority
states that exacting scrutiny is the “most exacting scrutiny” and re-
quires the government to use the least restrictive means to effectuate
government purpose.188  However, Ashcroft v. ACLU states that it is
when a plaintiff challenges a content-based speech restriction that
“the burden is on the Government to prove that the proposed alterna-
tives will not be as effective as the challenged statute.”189  Nowhere
else in the cases cited by the Minnesota Citizens majority does the Su-
182. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 10A.24(1) (West 2005).
183. See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
184. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 645.17 (West 1947).
185. Minn. Citizens, 2012 WL 3822216, at *7 n.8.
186. See MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 10A.13(1), 10A.15(4) (West Supp. 2005); MINN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 10A.12(1)(b)(6), 10A.14(4), 10A.17(5), 10A.20(12), 10A.121(2),
211B.15(6)–(7) (West Supp. 2012).
187. See Minn. Citizens, 2012 WL 3822216, at *5.
188. Id. at *9 (citing Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 666 (2004)).
189. Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 665.
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preme Court specify that the government must use the “least restric-
tive means” to satisfy exacting scrutiny.190  Accordingly, Minnesota’s
statutes do not approach the level where their substantial relation to
the governmental interest in disclosure is eclipsed by the actual bur-
den they impose.  Under an exacting scrutiny analysis, these laws
pass muster.
B. Disclosure Requirements: The Fading Regulatory Tool
Disclosure laws are on firm constitutional footing after eight of
nine Supreme Court Justices voted in favor of upholding federal elec-
tion disclosure laws while invalidating other campaign finance laws in
Citizens United.191  Following that decision, such laws may be more
essential than ever.  In just one example among many, a severe con-
flict of interest in the West Virginia judiciary may never have seen the
light of day were it not for disclosure requirements.192  Yet, even as
corporate participation in political speech is becoming more pro-
nounced, legislatures are losing their ability to regulate elections—
and Minnesota Citizens is another example of this disturbing trend.
Campaign financiers have already discovered ways to navigate
around the contours of Citizens United by forming and dissolving a
corporation so quickly that annual reporting requirements are not
triggered.193  While he notes the importance of honoring the legisla-
ture’s intent,194 Chief Judge Riley’s lack of deference to Minnesota’s
legislative experimentation with measures that could combat this and
other campaign finance problems is troublesome.
But Minnesota is not the only state where legislative regulation of
elections is in peril.  In June 2011, the Supreme Court struck down
the Arizona Citizens Clean Election Act, which provided escalating
matching funds to candidates accepting public financing based on
amounts spent by their privately financed opponents and independent
190. See Minn. Citizens, 2012 WL 3822216, at *9 (collecting cases).
191. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 886 (2010).
192. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009) (ruling that an
appellate judge’s refusal to recuse himself, in light of the risk of actual bias, de-
prived petitioners of due process).  In 2004, Massey Coal Company President Don
Blankenship spent nearly $3 million of his own money on contributions and inde-
pendent expenditures for embattled Justice Brent Benjamin of the Supreme
Court of Appeals of West Virginia, who won his election and later cast the decid-
ing vote to overturn a $50 million tort verdict against Massey. Id. at 2257–58.
Notably, Justice Kennedy, who wrote the majority opinion in Citizens United,
wrote the majority opinion in Caperton. See id. at 2256.
193. See Paul Blumenthal, Secret Corporate Money Powers Pro-Romney Super PAC,
HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 4, 2009, 9:14 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/
08/04/w-spann-llc-restore-our-future_n_918051.html.
194. See Minn. Citizens, 2012 WL 3822216, at *10.
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groups supporting them.195  The majority viewed the matching funds
scheme as a burden on speech “inhibit[ing] robust and wide-open de-
bate” as a candidate could be reluctant to spend money on political
speech if it triggered taxpayer subsidization of an opponent’s
speech.196  Justice Elena Kagan’s dissent, joined by three other Jus-
tices, instead advocated for deference to Arizona lawmakers:
“Arizonans deserve a government that represents and serves them
all . . . .  Arizonans deserve the chance to reform their electoral system
so as to attain that most American of goals.”197
Freedom Club PAC, the fifth successive ruling from the Roberts
Court scaling back the government’s ability to regulate campaign fi-
nance,198 has far-reaching ramifications as multiple states, including
Nebraska, have clean-election laws that are now invalid.199  Addition-
ally, in the summer of 2012, the Supreme Court struck down Montana
campaign finance restrictions that had been in place for decades.200
As corporate participation in campaign finance becomes increasingly
less restricted, lawmakers are running out of options to regulate cor-
porate election activity.
Nonetheless, regulatory options still overwhelmingly supported
are disclaimer and disclosure provisions.201  Disclosure is one of the
few remaining tools legislatures have at their disposal to regulate
campaign finance, yet it is in peril.  An Eighth Circuit ruling invali-
dating Minnesota’s laws is another incremental step toward diluting
the effectiveness of disclosure provisions.  An inability to require peri-
odic reporting could make it simpler for corporations to circumnavi-
gate disclosure purposes, and, if subjected to such reporting, they
could sue to invalidate the disclosure provision simply by making an
argument that its burden kept them from engaging in political speech.
Indeed, merely claiming that Minnesota’s laws had hindered the
195. Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2813–14
(2011).  One stated purpose of these types of laws is to “sever political candidates’
dependence on large contributors.” Id. at 2845 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
196. Id. at 2823, 2829.  However, one study found that candidates who accept clean-
election funds are significantly more likely to spend time interacting with voters.
So, rather than clean-election funding chilling speech by reducing a privately
funded candidate’s incentive to spend money/speak in an election, it appears that
“the absence of clean-election funding chills the ability of voters to speak to their
candidates . . . .”  Ezra Klein, The Importance of Campaign-Finance Reform in
One Graph, WASH. POST, WONKBLOG (Mar. 23, 2011, 5:58 PM), http://www.wash-
ingtonpost.com/blogs/ezra-klein/post/the-importance-of-campaign-finance-re-
form-in-one-graph/2011/03/18/ABka8iKB_blog.html.
197. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. at 2846 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
198. Adam Liptak, Justices Strike Down Arizona Campaign Finance Law, N.Y. TIMES,
June 27, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/28/us/politics/28campaign.html.
199. See State ex rel. Bruning v. Gale, 284 Neb. 257, 817 N.W.2d 768 (2012).
200. Am. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 1307 (2012).
201. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 886 (2010).
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plaintiffs’ speech was enough to convince the Eighth Circuit that “the
collective burdens” of the Minnesota law created a chill on political
speech that was “more than a theoretical concern.”202  Unfortunately,
these policy arguments likely cannot play a role in the final determi-
nation of whether an injunction is called for as the Eighth Circuit
ruled that the law is likely unconstitutional, thus automatically satis-
fying the public interest element of obtaining an injunction.203
But not all is doom and gloom on this campaign finance front.  In
Human Life of Washington, Inc. v. Brumsickle204 the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals upheld Washington’s public disclosure laws.  Though
it is arguable that those laws are distinguishable because they were
enacted via a ballot initiative,205 the fact remains that disclosure pro-
visions containing periodic reporting requirements similar to Minne-
sota Citizens’ were upheld by a different circuit court.206  More
recently, the First Circuit issued two rulings upholding Maine and
Rhode Island disclosure laws.207  The Rhode Island law was chal-
lenged as overbroad and vague but was held to impose little burden
while promoting an important government interest in identifying any
individual giving more than $100 to support or defeat a candidate.208
The Maine law also obligated any person spending more than an ag-
gregate of $100 for communications expressly advocating the election
or defeat of a candidate to report the expenditure.209  The court con-
cluded that “the modest amount of information requested is not un-
duly burdensome and ties directly and closely to the relevant
government interests.”210
202. Minn. Citizens for Life, Inc. v. Swanson, No. 10-3126, 2012 WL 3822216, at *7
(8th Cir. Sept. 5, 2012) (en banc).
203. Id. at *4 (citing Phelps-Roper v. Troutman, 662 F.3d 485 (8th Cir. 2011) (per
curiam)).
204. 624 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1477 (2010).  The suit was in
response to a state initiative on assisted suicide, and the plaintiff, a pro-life
group, desired to advocate against the initiative through messaging but feared it
would then be exposed to Washington’s disclosure laws. Id. at 995–96.
205. Id. at 996.
206. Some of the disclosure requirements challenged by the group could be viewed as
more burdensome than those in Minnesota Citizens, such as one requiring
monthly reports if a political committee’s total contributions or expenditures in a
previous month exceeded $200. Id. at 994–98.
207. Nat’l Org. for Marriage v. Daluz, 654 F.3d 115 (1st Cir. 2011); Nat’l Org. for Mar-
riage v. McKee, 649 F.3d 34 (1st Cir. 2011).
208. Daluz, 654 F.3d at 118.  James Bopp Jr. represented the National Organization
for Marriage in these two actions as well. Id. at 116.  In Daluz, he argued that
Rhode Island lacked a sufficiently important interest to support a $100 reporting
threshold, but the court rejected this argument because, under a “wholly without
rationality” standard, the $100 threshold passed muster. Id. at 119.
209. McKee, 649 F.3d at 59 (citing ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 1019-B (1)(A), (3)
(2008) (repealed in part 2011)).
210. Id. (quoting Daggett v. Comm’n on Governmental Ethics and Election Practices,
205 F.3d 445, 466 (1st Cir. 2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
2013] DISCLOSURE BURDENS 735
These rulings indicate permissiveness toward these types of disclo-
sure provisions; however, federal appeals courts are now split 3–3 on
disclosure laws, “making the issue ripe for consideration by the U.S.
Supreme Court.”211  It remains to be seen whether Minnesota will ap-
peal the Eighth Circuit ruling, though it appears that attorney James
Bopp Jr. will continue his crusade against election laws.212  If ap-
pealed to the Supreme Court, this may spell disaster for Minnesota’s
laws as the Roberts Court seems to be where campaign finance laws
go to die.  Still, disclosure laws are on firm constitutional footing as
the Supreme Court has dispensed with numerous other campaign fi-
nance laws while protecting disclosure provisions.  The strong under-
lying policy of this one remaining control mechanism at legislatures’
disposal may in the long run win the day in favor of upholding Minne-
sota’s laws.
IV. CONCLUSION
With a seasoned analysis, Minnesota’s laws pass constitutional
muster and should have been upheld in the en banc hearing.  First,
they are materially consistent with disclosure provisions upheld in
Citizens United.  Second, in so much as aspects of Minnesota’s laws,
such as the ongoing reporting requirements, are distinguishable from
Citizens United, these laws have a design and purpose intended to
promote disclosure.  Further, the burden imposed by these laws is not
so great that it overshadows the governmental interest in disclosure.
Not only should these laws be subjected to an exacting scrutiny stan-
dard, they would withstand such scrutiny.  Finally, disclosure is one of
the few remaining mechanisms for campaign finance, and it would be
poor policy to further erode this regulatory tool.  Viewing these legal
and policy justifications for Minnesota’s laws in tandem, it is at least
questionable whether Minnesota Citizens could prove that it would be
likely to prevail on the merits of its case.213
Tommy and Joey may feel overwhelmed and perhaps even slighted
by the extensive requirements they once faced just for putting some
signs up in their studio.  Nevertheless, if they had dug deeper they
would have grasped the fundamentals behind the government’s insis-
tence on their disclosure.  While they were caught in the net of Minne-
sota’s statutory disclosure scheme, so were many others whose
influence on elections would never be known were it not for the state’s
laws.  If the pair made the choice to continue making their own inde-
211. Appeals Court Rejects MN Corporate Disclosure Law, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 6,
2012, available at http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-505245_162-57507220/appeals-
court-rejects-mn-corporate-disclosure-law/.
212. Id.
213. See Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. v. Swanson, No. 10-3126, 2012 WL
3822216, at *4 (8th Cir. Sept. 5, 2012) (en banc).
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pendent expenditures, they could have applied just a bit of business
savvy to avoid most of the burden from the regulations they now face.
Further, they had the ability to research and find out who else made
independent expenditures in support of Governor Daley and in turn
others could determine who Tommy and Joey have chosen to give in-
dependent support to as well.  This disclosure serves purposes of both
preventing corruption of elected officials and preserving the ideal of
transparency in government.  Unlike a restriction on what a corpora-
tion can and cannot spend on an election,214 disclosure puts power
directly into the hands of people to decide what corruption means and
how best to combat it.  This power should not be snatched away with
an inexplicable argument that it imposes some burden on
corporations.
214. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010).
